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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
(1946); Hess v. Marinari, supra. However, in those instances where
the compensatory damages are not adequate to punish the defendant,
punitive damages will also be assessed to deter others from pursuing
a similar course of conduct and to serve as a warning of the possible
consequences of willful or reckless conduct. To hold the insurer
liable for these additional damages would seem to defeat the purpose
of the court in assessing them. The insured would be allowed
to protect himself from civil punishment by obtaining liability in-
surance. The most effective way to punish the defendant would
be to make him personally responsible for the payment of the
punitive damages by excluding them from automobile accident lia-
bility coverage.
Harold Dale Brewster, Jr.
Evidence-Attorney-Corporation Client Privilege
Files of documents from a law firm were examined during
pre-trial discovery. It was contended that the information contained
in the files was obtained by the law firm in its capacity as attorneys
for D corporation and that the attorney-client privilege was applica-
ble thereto. Held, a corporation is not entitled to claim the attorney-
client privilege because, historically, it was created for natural persons
only, and it is unrealistic to believe that confidentiality can be pre-
served for a corporation. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
The decision in the principal case will, no doubt, cause much
activity among corporations and research by their attorneys for
reasons and arguments in opposition to the court's conclusions. The
court placed much emphasis on the idea that the privilege has been
taken for granted without a proper reliance on precedent. The
instant case has already been challenged in Philadelphia v. Westing-
house Corp., 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2202 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 1962). Al-
though admitting that the principal case was supported by logic,
it was unable to accept the result and reasoned that the availability
of the privilege has gone unchallenged so long and has been so
generally accepted that it must be recognized to exist.
The attorney-client privilege, dating back to the reign of Eliza-
beth I, is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications.
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8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The privi-
lege encourages freedom of consultation. The client possesses the
privilege and controls the retention or waiver thereof. The soundness
of the theory has seldom been questioned. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The often quoted definition of
the privilege is stated in these words:
"(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2)
from a professional advisor in his capacity as such,
(3) the communication relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are
at his legal instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8)
except the protection be waived." 8 WiGMORE, Evi-
ENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
The landmark case allowing corporations to seek the privilege is
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357
(D.C. Mass. 1950). The court sets forth the main qualifications
necessary to a claim of the privilege. These qualifications include
a client or prospective client and a member of the bar of a court
acting as a lawyer; a communication relating to a fact of which the
lawyer was informed by his client, without the presence of strangers,
to secure legal advice, and not for the purpose of committing a crime
or a tort; and, finally, the communication protected by the privilege
claimed and not waived by the client. The United Shoe case held
the corporation could claim the privilege when the communication
was with house counsel. See Strack, Attorney-Client Privilege-
House Counsel, 12 Bus. LAW. 229 (1957), for a compilation of
cases involving corporation client and discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
To be distinguished from the attorney-client privilege is the
"work product" privilege, developed and recognized for the attorney
and not for the client. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1946),
this privilege was enunciated. P, in an action against D tug owners
to recover for the death of a seaman in the sinking of a tug, filed
interrogatories requesting copies of written statements and summaries
of oral statements that were taken by D's attorney in connection
with the accident. There was no showing of necessity or justification
for the request. D's attorney refused to comply and was held in
contempt. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme
Court affirmed. The Court recognized a privilege for the work of the
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attorney compiled in preparing the client's case. Accordingly, the
attorney should not meet with needless interference impeding his
client's interest. Although the discovery portions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed, the Court held
the burden rests on the party seeking to invade the privilege to show
justification for the production of the information.
The West Virginia position on whether a corporation may claim
the attorney-client privilege appears never to have been adjudicated
by the Supreme Court of Appeals. Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege in West Virginia, 54 W. VA. L. REv. 297 (1952), dis-
cusses the relationship as it applies to natural persons. W. VA. CODE
ch. 50, art. 6, § 10 (Michie 1961), which encompasses those per-
sons incompetent to testify, has been held to apply to justice of the
peace practice, not to courts of record. Mohr v. Mohr, 119 W. Va.
253, 193 S.E. 121 (1937). State v. Douglass, 20 W. Va. 770,
780 (1882), declares that the principle of the attorney-client privilege
is a fundamental one of evidence and greater harm would probably
result from requiring disclosure than from refusal thereof. Without
the privilege, the court said, the ends of justice, in many cases,
could not be attained because of the reluctance of a client to make
a full and confidential communication to an attorney.
In view of the decision in the Radiant Burners case and the
fact that the issue appears never to have been directly decided in
either the Supreme Court of the United States or in the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, the question of the privilege as applied
to corporations is one of moment and court rulings thereon may
be anticipated. Arguments on both sides have much reason and
logic. The court in the Radiant Burners case relied on the history
of the privilege to deny it to corporations. It is fundamentally per-
sonal in nature. Analogous to it is the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion which can be claimed only by natural persons and not by
corporate entities. Without legislation, the privilege between attorney-
client should remain as it was created-only for natural persons.
The court's concern also lies in the requirement of confidentiality.
If the communication be disclosed to third parties, anyone other than
the attorney or the client, the confidence has been "profaned" and
the privilege terminated. The privilege "ought to be strictly con-
fined with the logic of its principle." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Who within the corporation can
be considered within the term "client"? The court concludes that
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stockholders best qualify as the client, it being only for their benefit
that the corporation could claim the privilege. But, with so many
persons involved, the confidential nature of the communication
could never exist. The court concludes that both the privilege of
attorney-client and protection against self-incrimination had their
origin at common law in criminal law and are very closely akin. The
attorney-client privilege was extended to civil litigation, although
retaining its personal character. However, due to the secrecy re-
quired, the court could not extend it to corporate parties.
The court's rationale in Philadelphia v. Westingtouse Electric
Corp., supra, was in effect that the privilege was too firmly en-
trenched to be rejected. The court's solution as to whom within
the corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege was related
to authority. If the employee making the communication "is in a
position to control or take a substantial part in a decision about
any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of
the attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or group,
which has that authority, then, in effect he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer, and the
privilege would apply." The court noted that United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra, suggests a very broad class
of employees, whereas the Hickman v. Taylor, supra, limits the
class. It must be remembered the Hickman case discussed and dealt
with the privilege of "work product." In referring to the attorney-
client privilege, the court said the documents under consideration
fell outside the scope of that privilege. It did not attempt to elaborate.
The position has been taken that if the attorney-client privilege
is viewed in the light of a "rule of policy designed to facilitate the
workings of justice," the privilege should apply to corporate com-
munications. Those who motivate the corporation need the privilege
to encourage full disclosure to counsel. Just as an individual is
concerned for his own well-being, so is there concern by the directors
for the corporate well-being. It is contended that, doctrinally, the
privilege may easily be applied to a corporate communication. It
is recognized that the privilege applies when the agent of the client
originates the communication and also when the agent acts as car-
rier between the client and attorney. Thus, it would be a short step
to apply the privilege to a corporation, which only acts through
agents, rather than as an individual. Symposium, The Lawyer-Client
Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics, and
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Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235 (1961). It is
recognized that a major problem arises as to which "agent" qualifies
as being able to apply the doctrine.
Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corpora-
tions, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956), provides an excellent depth study
of the problems involved in the attorney-corporation client privilege.
Including corporations within the privilege is favored.
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 26(1), would terminate the
lawyer-client privilege available to a corporation upon dissolution,
and RULE 26(3) (a) defines a client as a "corporation or other
association that directly or through an authorized representative, con-
suits a lawyer ... for the purpose of . . . securing legal relief."
Judicial review may soon be forthcoming on this question. Prior
to the Radiant Burners case, it was generally assumed corporations
could avail themselves of the attorney-client privilege. Attention
has now been sharply focused on the issue. Action by the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States will be
awaited.
Thomas Edward McHugh
Evidence-Witnesses--Impeachment of Court Witness By Prior
Statements
At D's trial for murder, the state sought to impeach a court
witness, called by the court at the state's request, by showing that
the witness had previously made a statement which he would not
acknowledge at the trial. The trial judge's ruling admitted only
the first sentence of the statement pertaining to the time and place
thereof. The state's attorney, over the objection of D's attorney,
and despite the judge's ruling, proceeded to introduce the contents
of the statement by inquiring of the witness whether he had made
specific statements. The judge, to remove any prejudicial error,
instructed the jury that the questions and answers were not to be
considered as evidence and that they related only to the credibility
of the witness. From an adverse judgment, D appealed. Held, re-
versed and case remanded for a new trial. The introduction of the
contents of the statement was prejudicial error. Rankin v. State,
143 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1962).
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